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Abstract: In recent years, there has been a great deal of interest on the role of social 
media in the so-called Arab Spring revolt, but the uprising was not the result of a 
sudden event. Before it began in late 2010, protests have been staged in some Arab 
countries that paved the way to this major event (Al-Rawi, 2014, p. 916; Cassara, 2013, 
p.191). As Gilad Lotan et al. noted (2011, p. 1376) each country has its own context; 
hence this article focusses on Tunisia. Tunisia was the first Arab country where the Arab
Spring began, on December 17, 2010, when Mohammed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor from 
Sidi Bouzid, set himself on fire in front of a public building. As it is necessary to 
understand what led to the growing interest on the role of social media, this article 
examines the digital activism, specifically on Twitter, which took place during the 
months that preceded the uprising in Tunisia. Thus, this article focusses on the latency 
phase of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, following the framework proposed by Alberto 
Melucci in his seminal work Nomads of the present (1989). 
As Alberto Melucci (1989) explained, in complex societies, social movements develop 
only in limited areas and for limited period of times. Therefore, the hidden network 
become visible whenever collective actors confront or come into conflict with a public 
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policy, and this feature of social movements Melucci calls the hidden efficacy of social 
movements (1989, p. 70-73). The identification of this type of action requires an 
analysis that recognizes the multiple factors (opportunities, limits, response) and does 
not simply assume that the movement is a given identity.  
Thus, the latency and the visible phases of a collective action are the two interrelated 
poles. In that sense, latency does not mean inactivity; rather, the potential for 
resistance or opposition is sewn into the everyday life (Melucci, 1989, p. 71).  
Following to this idea, the analysis has been carried out in two stages. In Stage 1 we 
mapped the network of the digital activism in pre-revolutionary Tunisia. Activism in 
Tunisia has been at work for many years, first offline and then online. Because our 
study focuses on the Arab Spring in Tunisia, however, this study analyses the digital 
activism in Tunisia during the year 2010. As we have noted already, we have identified 
it, according to Melucci’s proposal, as the latency phase of the movement. The second 
stage focuses on the qualitative content of the content analysis and semi-structured 
interviews.  
Palabras clave: movimientos sociales, análisis de redes sociales, Primavera Árabe, 
activismo.
Resumen: En los últimos años ha aumentado el interés por el papel de las redes 
sociales en la denominada revuelta de la Primavera Árabe. Este movimiento de gran 
importancia se inició a finales de 2010, pero las protestas organizadas en algunos 
países árabes allanaron el terreno para su formación (Al-Rawi, 2014, p. 916; Cassara, 
2013, p.191). Como señalaron Gilad Lotan et al. (2011, p. 1376), cada país parte de su 
propio contexto. Así, este artículo se centra en Túnez, el primer país árabe donde 
surgió el movimiento el 17 de diciembre de 2010, cuando Mohammed Bouazizi, un 
frutero de Sidi Bouzid, se prendió fuego ante un edificio público. Como es necesario 
entender qué motivó el interés creciente por el papel de las redes sociales, este 
artículo examina el activismo digital que tuvo lugar, particularmente en Twitter, durante
los meses anteriores al alzamiento tunecino.  
Así, este artículo se centra en el periodo de latencia de la Primavera Árabe en Túnez, 
según el marco propuesto por Alberto Melucci en su obra seminal Nomads of the 
present (1989). 
Como explicó este autor, en las sociedades complejas estos movimientos solo se 
desarrollan en zonas limitadas y durante periodos temporales limitados. Por lo tanto, la
red oculta se hace visible cuando los actores colectivos se enfrentan a o entran en 
conflicto con una política pública; este rasgo de los movimientos recibe el nombre de 
eficacia oculta, según Melucci (1989, p. 70-73). La identificación de esta clase de acción
requiere un análisis que reconozca múltiples factores (oportunidades, límites, 
respuesta) y no se limite a asumir que el movimiento posee una actividad dada. 
Así, la latencia y las fases visibles de una acción colectiva constituyen dos polos 
interrelacionados. En este sentido, latencia no implica inactividad, sino más bien 
potencial de resistencia u oposición inscrito en la vida cotidiana (Melucci, 1989, p. 71).  
Siguiendo esta idea, el análisis ha constado de dos fases. En la primera, trazamos el 
mapa de la red del activismo digital en la Túnez pre-revolucionaria. Este país posee un 
largo recorrido activista, primero fuera de línea y luego en línea. Pero como nuestro 
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estudio se centra en la Primavera Árabe de Túnez, se analiza el activismo digital del país
durante el año 2010. Como ya hemos señalado, según la propuesta de Melucci se trata 
de la fase de latencia del movimiento. La segunda fase se centra en el enfoque 
cualitativo basado en análisis de contenido y en entrevistas semiestructuradas. 
 
1. Social movements and network analysis
As John Krinsky and Nick Crossley have pointed out (2014, p. 3), the study of social 
movements and that of social networks have a long relationship in sociology. According
to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, actors have generally established previous relations, 
contentious or not, to other collective actors; those relations have shaped internal 
structures of the actors and helped to generate their stories (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly, 2004, p.132). Thus, actors consist of networks deploying partially shared histories,
cultures and collective connections with other actors. 
Social network analysis (SNA) enables us to conduct systematic investigations of 
network processes within social movement from two main perspectives (Diani, 2002, 
p.174). First, it helps us to analyse how collective action is affected by the actors’ 
embeddedness in pre-existing networks and, second, network analysis can be used to 
illustrate how social movement actors create new linkages that, in turn, constrain the 
subsequent development of protests (ibidem, p.175). As Passy (2003, p.41) notes, 
social networks perform various functions in the process of individual participation; 
specifically they intervene in at least three different ways. First, they intervene in the 
socialisation and construction of identities. In this function, networks generate 
structures of meaning that enable individuals to create identities with specific political 
contentions. Second, networks connect potentially participants to a social movement 
organisation. For this function, in particular, the structure of meanings arising from the 
relations between recruiters and recruits effects the intensity of participation. In this 
respect, close friends and participants who are already involved in a movement at the 
highest level of participation are better able to provide prospective members with trust
than other types of ties. Finally, networks intervene when people decide to join a 
movement. In sum up, networks are important not only because they provide 
individuals with an environment that facilities recruitment to social movements but 
also because they are able to create a structure of meanings (Passy, 2003, p.43).
These issues include questions about the diffusion of social movement performances 
or action, about the frames used by the movement and about the collective identities 
shared for the movement’s members. The concept of diffusion refers to the spread of 
some innovation through direct or indirect channels across members of a social system 
(Rogers, 1995). One cannot understand social movements without understanding the 
dynamics of diffusion (Kolins, Roberts and Soule, 2010, p.1). In classic diffusion models,
there is a transmission of some innovation between people, and it is impossible to 
have any diffusion without some kind of contact or network tie between individuals 
(Oliver and Myers, 2003, p.175). In this respect, networks ‘provide the channels 
whereby movement frames, repertoires, and sometimes even triggers are diffused 
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beyond instigators to a wider population of potential participants’ (Krinsky and 
Crossley, 2014, p.4). 
The concept of diffusion refers to the spread of some innovation through direct or 
indirect channels across members of a social system (Rogers, 1995). One cannot 
understand social movements without understanding the dynamics of diffusion (Kolins,
Roberts and Soule, 2010, p.1). As Kolins, Roberts and Soule (2010, p.4) have suggested 
the content of diffusion, that is, the innovation that is diffused, can occur across two 
primary dimensions of social movements: behavioural and ideational. The behavioural 
dimension involves the diffusion of movement tactics or collective action repertoires. 
The different forms of contentious actions (such as strikes, riots, and so on) may occur 
in waves, spreading from their original site of contention to others. 
Ideational diffusion occurs through the spread of collective action frames that define 
issues, goals, and targets (Kolins, Roberts and Soule, 2010, p.4). As some scholars 
(Benford and Snow, 1992, pp.135-136; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy and Zald, 1977) have 
noted, social movements do not arise in naturally from shared interests or grievances. 
To mobilise participation, social movements engage in a process of ‘production of ideas
and meaning’ (Snow and Benford, 1992, p.136).
One question that has been raised involves the dynamics of diffusion online. Earlier 
studies focus on the diffusion of information through the channels of interpersonal 
acquaintance networks (Krinsky and Crossley, 2014, p.5), which usually involves 
physical spaces. ICT’s, like Facebook as well as Twitter, combine aspects of 
interpersonal networks and mass-communication broadcast (Marlow, 2005, p.37) and 
can quickly join users from around the world, disseminating information through 
multiple channels quickly and across space and time. Paul Virilio (1977/2006) suggests 
that ‘space is no longer in geography- it is electronics’. As Anne Kaun (2015, p.90) 
argues, in that context, politics become less about physical space, but about the time 
regimes of technology, producing a shift from geo- to chrono- politics.
2. Research questions, objectivities and methodologies.
The aim of this section is to illustrate the objectives of this study and explain the 
methods adopted in this research. The research questions are initially explained. 
Secondly, we define the research’s general approach and, finally, the mixed approach, 
which combines quantitative and qualitative methods. 
The research questions are closely linked with the objectives of this study and have 
guided all the investigation process. The following research questions guided the 
inquiry:
RQ1: How the information was diffused in Twitter before the Arab Spring in Tunisia?
RQ2: How was the activist network built on Twitter before the Arab Spring in Tunisia?
RQ3: How were the frames and ideas presented in Twitter before the Arab Spring in 
Tunisia?
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Related to these research questions, the main objective of this study is to explore the 
use of digital networks, specifically Twitter, after and during the 2010-2011 uprising in 
Tunisia. To be specific, this study focusses on the following sub-objectives:
1. giving an account of the diffusion process on Twitter before the 2010-11 uprising in 
Tunisia,
2. identifying the information flow and the central nodes that controlled the 
information in Twitter,
3. discerning the moments, leading figures and ideas presented, and
4. understanding who was using which symbols and frames of interpretation 
recurrently.
The methodology of this research is based on a case study and a triangulation of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, namely social network analysis (RQ1 and RQ2), 
content analysis (RQ3) and in-depth semi- structured interviews (RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3). 
According to John W. Creswell (2009, p. 13) ‘case studies are s strategy of inquiry in 
which the research explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, or more 
individuals […] researches collect detailed information using a variety of data collection 
procedures over a sustained period of time’. The case study in this research, the digital 
activism in Tunisia before the 2010-2011 uprising, aims to provide empirical evidence 
concerning the use of digital networks by protesters and to contribute to help  bridge  
social movement studies and media and communication studies (Cammaerts, 2012, p. 
117).  Following to David A. Snow and Danny Tom (2002, p. 161) this research presents 
a single case that are not based on studies of one or more subcases. The case is the 
movement as a whole, and the objective is to situate it in time and place, in history 
that is, and to say something about its beliefs, its appeal and diffusion, and its 
operations.  
Related to movement networks, according to Ann Mische (2003, p. 258), ‘it is not just 
networks or membership that matter, but also how these relationships are 
represented, activated or suppressed  in social settings’. The obvious implication, given 
that the ‘doing’ and ‘representing’ of networks is not captured in sociometric graphs 
and matrices, is that network must supplement its procedures for mapping and 
measuring networks with more qualitative sensitive forms of analysis (Edwards & 
Crossley, 2009, p. 40). In addition, as Nick Crossley has pointed out ‘network structure 
is not the whole story, even for “network effects” and mechanisms, and for that reason
we need to supplement methods of formal network analysis with qualitative 
observations about what is “going on” within a network’ (Crossley, 2010, p. 18). 
Quantitative tools are important, firstly, because relational data are difficult to store, 
retrieve and analyse by conventional qualitative means. Graphs and adjacency matrices
provided relatively simple means of recording, storing and analysing relational data 
(Crossley, 2010, p. 4). Secondly, matrix and graphs are tools which take abstract form, 
and thereby they simplify the hurly burly of everyday interactions and relations. 
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However, the limitations of quantitative methods can be summarised in two points. 
The abstraction and simplification involved in an adjacency matrix, invaluable though it 
is, can for certain important purposes amount to over-abstraction and 
oversimplification (ibidem, p.6).
4. Data collected and analysis
According to John W. Creswell, in mixed methods ‘the qualitative and quantitative data 
are actually merged on one end of the continuum, kept separate on the other end of 
the continuum, or combined in some way between these two extremes’ (2009, p. 208).
In this study, the mix consists of integrating the two databases (quantitative and 
qualitative) by actually merging the quantitative data with the qualitative data 
(ibidem). In a first phase of the research, we analyse the quantitative data (through 
SNA), and, in the second phase, we will apply qualitative content analysis. The unit of 
analysis of each phase comes from the same database: the tweets collected before the 
2010-11 uprising in Tunisia. The main source of data about Twitter came from two 
sources: Topsy Pro and Twitter Advanced Search. Data were retrieved in two stages. 
First, data were gathered in the period from December, 2009- December 2010 from 
three hashtags: #ammar404, #manif22mai and #Tunileaks. As Anne Kaun has pointed 
out (2016, p. 52), the use of hashtag for mobilization ‘is a powerful illustration of how 
the movement has been described and how it describe itself’. We decided inductively 
to collect the data from these hashtags after a previous exploratory period. 
Online censorship in Tunisia was known as Ammar 404 referring to the ‘404 not found 
error’ that appeared when a website was censored. Initially Ammar404 was formed by 
a small group of bloggers who broke with the tradition of anonymity by posting their 
pictures on social media, like Facebook or Twitter. The goal of the hashtag was provide 
to the users the opportunity to denounce the websites that were blocked and 
censored. Thanks to it, the activist developed a list of censored blogs, and, in this way, 
they had the control of the blogs that were censored (Pérez-Altable, 2015, p. 25). The 
aim of the #manif22mai hashtag was to organize a great demonstration in different places, like 
Tunis, Paris or Montréal on May 22nd for the defence of freedom of expression in Tunisia. In this
case the role of Twitter was to disseminate all the information about the demonstration. This 
was the first attempt to establish the online-offline linkage. Until that moment, as the digital 
activist Ben Gharbia (2010) says “it was mainly limited to a hard core of digital activists and 
bloggers who are pushing for a political and social change”. As Lim (2013, p.4) noted, Tunisian 
digital activist are predominantly affluent, highly educated urbanities and they are more closely
connected to global activism than to local struggles. Actually on the May 22th protest, 
hundreds participated in the rallies held in front of Tunisian embassies in Paris, Bonn and New 
York, but in Tunis only a few dozen showed up to protest (Ben Gharbia, 2010). The last 
hashtag of this analysed is #Tunileaks, whichn refers to the Wikileaks cables regarding 
to Tunisia. The #Tunileaks was launched by Nawaat, a Tunisian collective blog which 
was censured in Tunisia until 14 January 2011 (Pérez-Altable, 2015, p. 26).
The sample comprises 4,624 tweets, and the aim is to establish the network of digital 
activism in Tunisia during the time that preceded the uprising. This first stage 
corresponds with what Alberto Melucci called latency phase. The latency phase of a 
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social movement refers to the day to day movement activities, such as preparing 
protest, fundraising or decision-making processes and develops new cultural codes, 
reciprocal identification, solidarity ties and emotional investments (Flesher Fominaya, 
2010a, p. 384; 2010b, p.298). These actions can serve as catalyst for latent demands 
(Melucci, 1996, p.296).
Data analysis involved formal network measures, descriptive statistics and qualitative 
accounts and was conducted in two steps. The first step of the analysis focusses on the 
features of dyadic exchanges by looking at the information flow and how the 
information was disseminated on Twitter, the focus on the centrality of the net, in 
order to establish who the nodes were which controlled the information flow and how 
the information was spread. The second step involved qualitative analysis of the data, 
that is, a qualitative content analysis. This stage focus not on the way the messages 
were disseminated but in what said these messages and what frames were used. The 
qualitative analysis also involves the analysis of the interviews carried out with Tunisian
activists.
After the data collection, we divided our analysis into three related stages. In the first stage, we
applied social network analysis. Data processing was done by a semi-automatic process. After 
collecting the data, we generated a .txt document, where each line contained the user, the real 
name of the user, the data, and the content of the tweet. Due to the high amount of data of 
our collection, we processed this file in an automatic way and, thus, we obtain a CSV file with 
six columns: column A provides the user, column B, the hahstags present in the tweet, column 
C the user retweeted or mentioned, column D the links present in the tweet and, finally, 
column E the type of tweet (RT: retweet, TW: original tweet). Figures 1 and 2 show an example 
of our data collection before and after of processing.
Figure 1. Data before processing
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Figure 2. Data before processing
With this file we generated a node list. In a nodelist, the first name in each row gives 
the node that is ‘sending’ a tie – the ego. The names that follow in the same row are 
the nodes receiving a tie – the alters (Borgatti et al., 2013, p. 66). The software used to 
process the generated the node list was UCINET.  Figure 3 shows a screenshot of the 
UCINET DL Editor spreadsheet with an example of node list of our data collection. 
When we our edgelist, we analysed the data using UCINET. the program allows us to 
measure the properties of the network on the whole and on the element level.
Figure 3. Example of node list
For the visualization of the network we used NetDraw, a free sofware developed by 
Steve  Borgatti. Analysing our data with UCINET, we obtained the centrality measures. 
Thus, we can identify who the most central nodes were in the networks.
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The second stage consisted in the qualitative content analysis. We carried out the 
analysis manually. First, we read the sample and then, with the help of the previous 
literature (Lotan et al., 2011, Poell, 2014), we establish some codes. We compared our 
data with the codes that we had and, in a second lecture of our sample, we reduce  the
number  of  codes  in  order  to  be  the  most accurate possible with our research 
questions and our objectives. The qualitative content analysis allows us to detect topics
and themes present on the network. 
Finally, in the next stage we carried out the interviews with activists. Because we had 
already identified the most prominent nodes, we knew who the Tunisian activists were 
who appeared in the networks. Moreover, with the results of the content analysis, we 
could formulate questions related to the themes present on the network. We travelled 
to Tunisia for the fieldwork in June 2015, and we conducted face-to-face two 
interviews. We had planned another interview in Tunisia but unfortunately we could 
not meet with the interviewee face-to-face and we conducted the interview by 
Internet (voice call services). Interviewee number 2 was based in the United States; so 
we carried out the interview by Internet, with a voice call services.
5. Digital activism in Tunisia before the Arab Spring
The structure of digital network in Tunisia before the Arab Spring provides some clues 
as to the way that digital activist organised themselves on Twitter. One way of 
conceptualising networks mathematically is as graph (Borgatti et al., 2013, p. 11). In 
addition, graph theory gives us a representation of a social network as a model; is an 
elemental way to represent actors and relations. In a graph, nodes are represented as 
points in a two-dimensional space and arcs are represented by directed arrows 
between these points (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 73).
The data collection contains much data. In order to gain a clearer picture of the activist 
network of digital activism in Tunisia before the Arab Spring, we thus mapped the 
network in two stages (Edwards & Crossley, 2009, p. 44). In a first stage (see Figure 4), 
we mapped the whole network, and, in a second stage (see Figure 5), we focussed on 
the core of the network, according to the in-degree centrality measure. The sizes of the
nodes depend on their in-degree value.
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Figure 4. The tunisian digital activism network before the Arab Spring
Figure 5. The core of the Tunisian digital activism before the Arab Spring
5.1 The anticensorship movement in Tunisia before the Arab Spring
In April 2010, following a massive wave of online censorship, the anti-censorship 
movement began a virtual protest, especially on social media sites like Twitter, 
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Facebook, blogs, and even popular multimedia-sharing websites, as YouTube or Flickr 
(Ferjani, 2011, p.18).
As interviewee 2 notes:
One of the major tasks that became more and more difficult Tunisian government was to 
manage the new sites of social interactions in social media sites like Facebook, blogging 
communities, especially. When some civil voices became too loud they would be noticed by 
federal censorship and monitoring agencies. Then these individual bloggers and online voices 
would be censored by offline pressure through arrests and intimidation or through online 
measures by turning off their websites, censoring their activities through algorithmic 
measures, or blocking of IP addresses. It was really 2010 and onwards that we see a very 
explicit coordination of discussing the political utility and the risks of web-based strategies and
tools (Interviewee 2).
Online censorship was personified in an imaginary person, known as Ammar404, 
referring to the 404 not found error that appeared when a website was censored. 
Initially, Ammar404 was formed by a small group of bloggers who broke with the 
tradition of anonymity by posting their pictures on social media, like Facebook or 
Twitter. The goal of the hashtag #free404 was provide to the users the opportunity to 
denounce blocking and censoring of websites, as we can see in the follow tweets: 
[@escalier7 20 Apr 2010] http://ammar404.tumblr.com/  est  censuré  #free404 #ammar404 
#censure 
[RadMejri 30 Apr 2010] censure  du  blog  Kissa  OnLine http://kissa-online.blogspot.com/ 
#free404
[@Souihli 30 Apr 2010] RT:@Selim_ RT:@barbach censure du blog Pour Gafsa (6eme edition) 
http://pourgafsa5.blogspot.com/ #free404
[@kristyman 30 Apr 2010] meme la pgae qui parle de censure en #Tunisie sur #wikipedia a ete
censure: http://bit.ly/dspVaA #free404
[@Selim_ 30 Apr 2010] RT:@barbach mon blog tkharbich http://bit.ly/9YcwNn est censuré 
aujourd'hui #free404
[@RamyRaoof 20 May 2010] Why #skype is not working properly in #Tunisia, since may 3rd, 
2010 is skype the next target of TN censorship machine    #free404 #manif22mai 
[@ByLasKo 11 May 2010] http://twitter.com/samiTunis est censuré en Tunisie, j'attends mon 
tour via @Souihli #Free404 #sayebsala7
These anti-censorship efforts were involved in a wide range of initiatives. For example, 
activists developed a list of censured blogs, and, in this way, they had the control of the
websites that were censored.   Figures   6   shows   a   document   where   the activist 
reported the censored websites.
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Figure 6. Document with censored blogs in Tunisia before the Arab Spring
As we have noted, social media as Twitter, provides an infrastructure which determines
the patterns of communication, and understanding these patterns is basic for 
understanding the logic of connective action in the new wave of protests and social 
movements. In these platforms, collective identity is constructed. To build this 
collective identity is necessary, at least, to identify of the other and the construction of 
the we. In the case of pre-revolutionary Tunisia, the construction of the other is 
personalised in the figure of Ammar404, opposite to the we, the activists who fight 
against the censorship in Tunisia. Moreover, as the use of Twitter and social media 
platforms shows, persistent ways of coordination between activists are necessary for 
achieving their goals. 
Due to the wave of censorship that took place in Tunisia in early 2010, activists decided
to organise a demonstration against that censorship and for the defense of freedom of 
expression in Tunisia. Interviewee 1 explains that
We decided to organise this demonstration in April 2010 and we chose the date May 22. Well, 
we decided we are going to organise the demonstration simultaneously in Tunis, the capital of
Tunisia, and then in Canada, Montreal, Paris, and New York […] We were because all the time 
censorship started to target even blogs of photography and other as Daily Motion. People 
couldn't see, for example, football matches anymore on Youtube or music or whatever. We 
tried to attract people to support us. (Interviewee 1)
As interviewee 3 explains, the initiative for the demonstration came from Amira 
Yahyaoui. Amira is a Tunisian human rights activist who was exiled in France, but she 
kept in touch with activists in Tunisia. Her father, Mukhtar Yahyaoui, was a judge. In 
2001, when Mukhtar was the President of the First Instance Court in Tunisia, he sent a 
letter to Ben Ali denouncing for first time the Tunisian judiciary’s lack of independence. 
He was dismissed and forced to exile to France. Moreover, Zouhair Yahyaoui, the 
Amira’s cousin, founded the satirical website TUNeZINE and was the first cyber-
dissident to be pursued and condemned in Tunisia. He was arrested for first time in 
2002 and he was being tortured in prison. After leaving prison, he died at 37 of a heart 
attack on 13 March 2005. According to interviewee 3:
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[the demonstration] started with Amira Yayahoui. Amira Yayahoui is a human rights activist 
and she was in  France. She  couldn't come to Tunisia. […] She decided to do a demonstration 
in France against censorship. I contacted her, I was in Tunisia told her that it's not that to do it 
in France, we should do it in Tunisia […] I asked how to do demonstration in Tunisia because 
no one know how to do a demonstration. [She] told me you have to go to the  law of January 
69 and you find all the rules how to do demonstration. To do a demonstration you need 2 
people, 2 or more until 40 people to sign [the declaration]. I wrote the main things to write in 
this declaration and I put on my Facebook,  "Who want to sign the declaration for 
demonstration?" One guy, Yassine Ayari, he's an activist, global activist contacted me and he 
said, "If you do it I'll do it." He didn't know me. He just see that I'm activist, I'm on the 
internet, on Facebook mainly […] I put him in contact with Amira Yayahoui. (Interviewee 3)
However, following with the interviewee 3, during the organisation of the 
demonstration there was a problem concerning to the declaration. The aim of the 
demonstration was against the censorship and for the freedom of speech, so if the 
signers belonged a political party, it could be a problem:
She said I will sign it and see the few and to her too. I spoke with Amira I said, "No, we don't 
need political people. We want people like apolitical, people like to say it's peaceful thing, not 
think about politics. We just want freedom of expression and that's it.” After this we contacted
[…], he's one of the main and the best blogger and activist that you can think like he's very 
brave guy. He was in a party. He said, "Yes. I want to sign it, to sign the declaration." Amira 
said, "No, you are in party.” […] Finally Yassine Ayari, the guy who contacted me and Slim 
Amamou another guy, they signed the declaration and continued working. That's it 
(Interviewee 3).
Yassine Ayari is a Tunisian computer engineer and activist, and Slim Amamou is a 
blogger and anti-censorship activist. Slim played an important role before the 
revolution, organising protests and   initiatives   against   the   censorship   in   Tunisia.   
After the revolution, he took part in the Transitional Government and he became 
Secretary of State for Sport and Youth. He resigned from the role on May 25, 2011 in 
protest of the censorship of several websites carried out by the Transitional 
Government. He was arrested on 21 May 2010, and then on Jan. 6, 2011, during the 
uprising. Figure 7 shows screenshots of a video titled “How to organise a 
demonstration in Tunisia”, released on Vimeo in May 2010. Among four different 
videos, Slim Amamou and Yassine Yassayari, the two guys who, according to 
interviewee 3, signed the declaration, explain the process.
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 Figure 7. Screenshot of ‘How to organise a demonstration in Tunisia’ video
Slim Amamou and Yassine Ayari were arrested on May 21 2010, the day before to the 
demonstration, and they were detained for more than 12 hours. Finally, Slim and 
Yassine were forced to make an announcement in order to call off the rally and urge to 
protestors to stay at home:
Figure 8. Screenshots of Yassine and Slim announcement video
Although the demonstration was forbidden, activists decided to raise a flashmob in
the coffees of Tunisia’s main avenue, Habib Bourguiba. The requirement for the 
participants in the flash-mob was to wear a white t-shirt:
[@malekk 18 May 2010] Action T-shirt Blanc ! le 22 mai à 15h Nhar 3la 3ammar... 
http://tinyurl.com/2up5wax #manif22mai
[@nhar33 19 May 2010] Pour soutenir la #manif22mai tu peux: participer a la manif de Tunis, 
manifester devant nos consulats, mettre un T-shirt blanc, en parler…
[@SayebSala7 19 May 2010] RT:@ByLasKo Action T-shirt Blanc ! le 22 mai à 15h Nhar 3la 
3ammar.. http://tinyurl.com/2up5wax #manif22mai via @malekk
[@cdutheil 6 Aug 2010] #Tunisie : Des internautes en T-shirts blancs interdits de flash  mob 
contre la censure #free404 http://bit.ly/9F5Ixw (via @ifikra)
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Finally, in spite of the fact that demonstration was forbidden, Tunisian activists 
took the main street in Tunis, Habib Bourguiba Avenue, and wore their white t-
shirts in order to protests against the censorship:
Figure 9. Protests against censorship (Tunisia, 22 May 2010)
Twitter was chosen as one of the most common forms to disseminate information 
about the demonstration.  Social media platforms, such as Twitter, allow for a great
deal of participation in protest. Figure 10 shows one example of how activist used 
social media to mobilise:
Figure 10. Neo’s message to Ammar404 video
According to interviewees, the initiative of 22 May 2010 was an important for the 
cyber-activists because, as interviewee 1 saidt, they for the first time left their 
screen and started with protests on the ground:
I think that May the 22nd was an important day. Well the day of course May 22nd but the 
whole campaign that started before May 22nd. It was the first time that bloggers cyberactivist 
decided to leave their screens and online campaigns and to come on the ground, protest on 
the ground against censorship and for freedom of speech. (Interviewee 1)
Interviewee 4 agreed that the day marked a change in the way of how Tunisian 
activist were working against the censorship:
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May 2010 was a memorable month of my whole life, I still have archives of the hundreds of 
exchanged emails in order to set up  the strike that day (that never really happened) and of 
course our Tunisians around the world did stick with us for this new twist. (Interviewee 4)
5.1 #Tunileaks: the Wikileaks cables about Tunisia
The word ‘Tunileaks’ refers to the Wikileaks cables about Tunisia. It was launch by 
Nawaat which is an independent collective blog founded in 2004 by Sami Ben Gharbia, 
Sufian Guerfali and Riyadh Guerfali. Then, in 2006, Malek Khadraoui joined the blog. 
The main goal of Nawaat’s founders was to provide a public platform for Tunisian 
dissident voices and debates. About one month before to the start of the Arab Spring 
in Tunisia, on Nov. 28, 2010, Nawaat launched ‘Tunileaks’, only one hour after Wikileaks
released the documents. tunileaks.org was a website dedicated to publishing the 
revelations related to   Tunisia. Those revelations (17 in total) focussed mainly on the 
neglect of human rights in Tunisia, the freedom of expression restrictions  and the 
widespread corruption of the Ben ali’s Government. Access to Tunileaks was rapidly 
blocked in Tunisia. It is important to reflect that in the West Wikileaks were published 
in the mainstream media (e.g., The New York Times, The Guardian, El País or Le 
Monde, among others) whereas in a country without freedom of expression, like 
Tunisia, a collective blog (i.e., Nawaat) served this purpose.
Nawaat announced the publication of the cables on Twitter and  the hashtag #tunileaks
was created on Twitter in order to provide a space where people within and outside 
Tunisia shared information about the revelations:
[@__Imen 28 Nov 2010] les #wikileaks concernant la Tunisie sont là #TuniLeaks 
http://bit.ly/hSvxxb relayés en exclu par @nawaat
[@Nawaat 28 Nov 2010] Nawaat  relayera  ce  soir,  en  exclusivité,  des  documents  
concernant la #Tunisie révélés par #Wikileaks… Restez connectés sur @nawaat
[@Nawaat 28 Nov 2010] Dans quelques minutes @nawaat diffusera en exclusivité certains 
des documents concernant la Tunisie révélés par #Wikileaks Restez connectés!
[@Nawaat 28 Nov 2010] les #Tunileaks sont aussi disponibles sur google docs 
http://is.gd/hVGpi (utiliser seulement le https) #wikileaks #Cablegate
[@ifikra 16 Dec 2010] #TuniLeaks on FP. Ben ALi'll fire the Washington Media Group which was
hired  burnish his Cosa Nostar for 420,000$/y http://is.gd/iQLx6
[@ifikra 15 Dec 2010] Leilatrabelsi.com vient d'être regsitré il y a deux jours !!! 
http://whois.domaintools.com/leilatrabelsi.com #tunileaks effect !!
However, an authoritarian regime, such as Ben Ali Regime was,  enforced a limited 
public sphere for socio-political reasons. The particularity of the revelations, however, 
was such that the Tunileaks gave the proof, the real documents about what was 
happened in Tunisia under the Ben Ali’s Regime. According to Interviewee 1:
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[Tunileaks] was really important. Actually we already knew all the stories released by 
Tunileaks. What was important was to have the proof, to have real documents. We used to 
hear these stories and we didn’t have evidence, but these leaks give us the evidences. 
(Interviewee 1)
The publicising of internal corruption and wide censorship that was happening, posed a
real threat to governments of all sort by exposing the internal activities of state 
leaders. Concerning to the importance of the revelations, and in harmony with 
Interviewee 1, Interviewee 4 says “I remember them like they were released yesterday, 
the impact was immense and for the first time, people were sharing pieces of Tunileaks
freely as they were pissed  of that rumours about corruption turned out to be true” 
(Interviewee 4).
From this statement, and given the timing of the release of the documents - just one 
month before the uprising started- it could be supposed out that the publications of 
the leaks could have connection with the start of the revolution which took place just 
one month before the revelations. However, as Interviewee 3 the relation between the 
publication of the Tunileaks and the Tunisian uprising in not clear:
Perhaps some diplomacy because it was putting the diplomacy of the government in bad 
situation […] The most important thing was the immolation of people, people who are burning
themselves. This thing was very important. The effect of this thing. In many towns find people 
burning themselves. They didn't write anything about Wikileaks they didn't write anything but
it was big fear and big fear a system. Of course social media was working on this thing like 
spreading the information. (Interviewee 3)
6. Conclusion
Digitally networked action has emerged in recent years among young people who have 
discovered in the Internet, and specifically, in social media, a powerful tool to mobilise 
against social injustice and regimes which have exerted oppression on citizens. The aim
of this article is to link social movement studies and media and communication studies 
in order to achieve a better understanding of the digitally networked action. 
As we have noted inthe introduction of this article, this study explores the digital 
activism in Tunisia before the Arab Spring, thus, according to Melucci’s (1989) proposal 
the latency phase of the movement that took place during the months that preceded 
the so-called Arab Spring.
Relating to the network in this latency phase, the main idea was the fight against 
censorship. We can identify this period as ‘the movement against the censorship’. in 
that sense, although Tunisia had some conomic and social problems in that time, we 
have not found many references to it. The conversation was primarily about the 
censorship. 
Our findings show that social media infrastructure was used by the Tunisian 
cyberactivists in many ways: in the case of Twitter to build a network to articulate their 
grievances and for engaging in a variety of collective actions in the offline world (e.g. 
the case of the demonstration on May 22). It is important that online and offline world 
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work together for achieving the goal, because the public space is where dissent 
becomes visible in order to reach more people. Twitter also was a central tool, above 
all used to organize and disseminate information. The graph of Tunisia’s social network 
indicates that there were central nodes and peripheral groups of nodes. The results 
may be interpreted as follows: it is reasonable to conclude that there were nodes with 
strong weight in the network and these tweets were retweeted by the users many 
times, so these nodes could be identified as opinion leaders. However, peripheral 
nodes also appear with weight in the network. This constitutes an online space where 
members of society can change their opinions. According to this, the Tunisia’s network 
public sphere was composed of digital elite and peripheral clusters of nodes. But the 
graph shows other peripheral cluster of nodes, away from the central nodes and 
underweight within the network. Hence, the overall conclusion is that Tunisia’s digital 
public sphere was a hybrid model based on the existence of digital elite and peripheral 
clusters of nodes. 
In that phase, the latent phase of the movement, we can identify the construction of a 
collective identity in that movement. There is an identification of we, the activists, 
against the other, in that case Ben Ali’s regime as represented in the imaginary figure of
Ammar404. Tunileaks also was an important event. Although the website of Tunileaks 
was blocked in Tunisia, the most important thing related to it was that for first time 
there was evidence of the corruption of Ben Ali’s regime. However, due to the fact that 
that Tunileaks were not available in Tunisia, we must be careful not to overstate the 
relation between the Tunileaks and the uprising that started in December, 2010, one 
month after. In conclusion, we can identify the movement of anti-censorship as the 
latent phase of the uprising because the pre-existence of the long-established online 
activism was decisive for the development of the uprising, although it is not the only 
reason that explains the uprising and its aftermath. 
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